This paper develops a multiperiod agency model to study the use of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake "soft" investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on leading indicator variables which provide a noisy forecast of the investment returns to be received in future periods. Our analysis relates the role of leading indicator variables to the duration of the manager's incentive contract.
Introduction
In the search for improved managerial performance measures, it appears that an increasing number of firms view accounting data as only one among several sources of information that are useful for aligning the long-run objectives of shareholders and managers.
1 One indication of the trend towards "broader" performance measures is the increasing reliance on stock grants and stock options in compensation packages for top level managers.
2 While stock price is acknowledged to be a noisy and therefore imperfect performance indicator which reflects numerous factors beyond management's control, the informational appeal of stock prices is that they project future financial outcomes resulting from management's current and past decisions.
3
Another illustration of the trend towards broader performance measures is provided by the Balanced Scorecard concept; see Norton (1996),(2001) . In addition to current accounting data, balanced scorecards report on a range of other variables pertaining to the firm's customer base, internal process efficiency, and organizational growth. These variables include both financial and non-financial indicators and some are measured subjectively (e.g., customer satisfaction) rather than objectively (e.g., cost reductions, defective output). Proponents of a broader approach to performance measurement cite several advantages for the inclusion of non-accounting variables. In particular, they point to the fact that many of the variables typically reported in a Balanced Scorecard are leading indicators of future profitability.
4 From an optimal contracting perspective, the natural question is whether performance measures become more effective by including imperfect indicators of future profitability.
5
A standard result in the agency literature is that any "informative" signal is valuable for contracting purposes (Holmstrom, 1979) . This result suggests that, irrespective of their noisiness, leading indicator variables -such as stock and/or non-financial variables -are useful for providing managerial incentives. 6 In a multiperiod agency setting, however, this argument requires further examination: leading indicator variables may provide additional information at an early stage but this information is supplanted by the actual results at a later stage. Thus, we ask whether an optimal performance measure must include a noisy forecast of future cash flows if receipt of the actual cash flows in the future can be adequately rewarded at that time.
One would expect the need for leading indicator variables to depend on the parties' planning horizons and on their abilities to make long-term contractual commitments.
7 To address this question formally, we develop a two-period model in which both investments and managerial effort are hidden information variables. While investments do not impose a personal cost on the manager, the principal nonetheless faces an "induced" incentive problem because the periodic cash flows reflect both the investment decision and the agent's managerial effort. We find that leading indicators can be valuable even under ideal contracting circumstances: the principal and the agent are equally patient and 5 Hauser, Simester and Wernerfelt (1994) , Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) and Banker, Potter and Srinivasan (2000) provide evidence on the use of various non-financial variables in managerial incentive schemes.
6 When different signals are aggregated linearly, it is generally optimal to choose the relative weights on the signals according to their "signal-to-noise ratio", see Banker and Datar (1989) , Lambert (2001) and Datar, Kulp and Lambert (2001) .
7 Sliwka (2001) concludes that non-financial performance indicators are not needed with full commitment to a long-term contract. Dikolli (2001) demonstrates a need for nonfinancial variables in a setting where the manager is more impatient than the principal. We will discuss these papers in more detail below.
they can commit to long-term contracts. The role of the leading indicator variable then is to provide matching between the first period investment and the future cash returns of that investment. Such intertemporal matching is useful for the principal in order to separate the investment problem from the periodic moral hazard problems.
8 In the extreme case where the leading indicator variable provides a perfect forecast of the second period cash return, the principal would obtain perfect matching by recognizing the net present value of the investment entirely in the first period performance measure. As a consequence, the agent would have the desired investment incentives irrespective of the compensation schemes used in the two periods. Clearly, such incentives could not be attained by contracts based only on cash flows.
Our analysis predicts that leading indicator variables are not needed for performance evaluation purposes when the parties enter into long-term contracts and furthermore the underlying moral hazard problems are stationary over time. The principal can then choose identical optimal compensation schemes so as to optimally address the moral hazard problem in each period. As a consequence, the manager will correctly internalize the future cash returns of current investment expenditures without reliance on the noisy leading indicator variable.
When the principal does not commit to a long-term contract but instead offers a sequence of one-period contracts, leading indicator variables becomes crucial for generating any investment incentives. Short-term contracting leads the principal to act in a sequentially rational fashion. In particular, the second-period incentive contract will be chosen opportunistically so as to appropriate all returns stemming from investments made in first period.
8 This matching function of leading indicator variables is related to recent work on the role of accruals in performance measures. For instance, Reichelstein (2000) and Dutta and Reichelstein (2002) show that it is preferable to generate investment incentives by using performance measures based on depreciation charges compared to performance measures based only on cash flows. While these papers consider long-term contracts, Wagenhofer (2001) obtains a similar conclusion in a setting in which the manager quits his job before all investment returns are received.
Anticipating this, the agent would not want to make any investments if the first-period incentive scheme were based on cash flow only. Inclusion of the leading indicator variable allows the principal to mitigate the holdup problem. Due to the noisiness of this variable, however, the optimal short-term contract does not completely alleviate the underinvestment problem.
The work of Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) has identified sufficient conditions for short-term contracts to achieve the same performance as long-term contracts. The nature of our investment variable violates their sufficient conditions since the impending investment return is not public information at the beginning of the second period. 9 We find that a potential advantage of long-term commitments is that investment incentives can be generated more cheaply. With a sequence of one-period contracts, any investment incentives derive from the weight placed on the leading indicator variable. In contrast, with a long-term contract the manager is motivated to invest partly because his bonus in the second period is responsive to the investment returns received in that period.
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Somewhat surprisingly, we find that under certain conditions the principal is better off not entering into a long-term contract with the manager.
When long-term contracts entail overinvestment due to more severe moral hazard problems over time, the principal does better with a sequence of oneperiod contracts which entail managerial rotation, i.e., a new manager is hired in the second period. As a consequence, it becomes possible to con-9 In all other respects our setting conforms to that of , though our analysis is more restrictive since we confine attention to a multiperiod LEN model, i.e. linear contracts, exponential utility and normally distributed noise terms.
10 One would also expect that, in comparison to short-term contracting, long-term contracting results in larger investments and less reliance on the leading indicator variable. We confirm this intuition for settings in which the underlying moral hazard problems become more severe over time. For the opposite setting, we obtain the counterintuitive finding that short-term contracting may lead to larger investments. This possibility again reflects the interaction between the investment-and the moral hazard problems. Under long-term contracting the principal may find it preferable to focus on the periodic moral hazard and, in the process, to "neglect" the investment incentives.
tain the agent's tendency to overinvest without having to compromise the periodic incentive provisions. We note that the usual replication argument, according to which the principal makes a long-term commitment to the same actions and contracts she would have chosen in equilibrium under short-term contracting, cannot be made in our setting. Short-term contracting requires managerial rotation, yet, by definition, this "strategy" is not feasible if the parties commit to a long-term contract at the outset.
Among earlier agency models addressing the need for non-financial performance indicators, Dikolli (2001) examines a one-period setting in which some component of the agent's action results in delayed outcomes. If the agent discounts later payments more heavily than the principal, it becomes advantageous to reward the agent based on a current but noisy indicator of the future outcome. In the context of a two-period model, Sliwka (2001) argues that optimal contracts cannot be based on noisy leading indicator variables provided the principal can make long-term commitments. However, leading indicator variables may become useful if the principal is confined to renegotiation-proof contracts.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Following the description of the model in the next section, we examine full commitment contracts in Section 3. Our results there show that optimal contracts must include the leading indicator variable and furthermore the agent's ability to commit to long-term contracts is of no consequence to the principal. Short-term contracts are analyzed in Section 4, and we compare the performance attainable under the two contracting scenarios in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
The Model
We consider a two-period contracting problem between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent (manager). In each period t ∈ {1, 2}, the manager contributes to the firm's current operating cash flow through personally costly effort a t . In addition, the manager makes an investment decision in the first 
with the random variablesε 1 andε 2 representing uncertain events that are beyond the manager's control. For contracting purposes, the principal can rely on the realized cash flow in each period. We assume that the principal does not observe the agent's choice of investment expenditures b. This assumption reflects the notion that for certain "soft" investments such as product-and process improvements or personnel training, it is frequently difficult for the accounting system to separate investment expenditures from ordinary operating expenses.
12 At the end of the first period, the parties can rely on an unbiased forecast of the investment payoff m(b) to be realized in the second period. This leading indicator, f , which is assumed to be verifiable and contractible, can be thought of as a non-financial performance variable. Applicable examples include measures of customer satisfaction, product quality, product awareness, on-time delivery etc. 13 For simplicity, we assume that f takes the form:
The unbiased noise termδ reflects residual uncertainty about the future investment returns.
For reasons of tractability, we adopt a multiperiod len framework, i.e., we confine attention to Linear contracts, Exponential utility and Normally distributed noise terms. In particular, the random variablesδ andε t are assumed to be independent and normally distributed such thatε t ∼ N(0, σ
The risk-neutral principal seeks to maximize the present value of future expected cash flows net of compensation payments. The manager is riskaverse and his preferences can be described by an additivity separable exponential utility function of the form:
where γ ≡ 1 1+r denotes the discount factor. In each period, the manager's current utility depends on his current consumption of money, φ t and the cost of current effort e(a t ). The function e(·) is increasing and convex with e (0) = 0 and e (a) → ∞ as a → ∞. Finally, the coefficientρ represents the agent's degree of absolute risk aversion.
It should be noted that in our model formulation the moral hazard problems are stationary except for possible differences in the variances ofε 1 and ε 2 . Differences in these variances will in effect be our proxy variable for intertemporal changes in the moral hazard problem.
14 13 Recent empirical work by and Nagar and Rajan (2001) has documented that improvements in customer satisfaction or product quality do indeed translate into higher future revenues.
14 Alternatively, we could have allowed for intertemporal variations in the agent's productivity of effort or for intertemporal variations in the cost of effort.
Consistent with earlier literature on repeated agency models, the agent is assumed to have access to third party banking. Specifically, the agent can borrow and lend in each period at the principal's interest rate r. Denoting the compensation payment in period t by s t and the agent's savings at date t by W t , consumption is given by
Access to third party banking for the agent ensures that the choice of incentive scheme does not need to be concerned with smoothing the agent's consumption over time. In combination with additivity separable exponential utility, these two assumptions imply that in any period t the agent's preferences over alternative incentive schemes are independent of his current wealth W t−1 . We therefore set W 0 = 0, without loss of generality. Upon leaving the firm, the agent is assumed to be able to earn a net-wage of zero,
i.e., he can earn a fixed wageŝ t by exerting effortâ t , such thatŝ t −e t (â t ) = 0. As part of the len framework, we restrict our attention to linear compensation schemes of the form:
where π t is the manager's performance measure in period t. The performance measure can be based on any linear combination of the available information variables at date t. In particular, π 1 can depend on c 1 and f and π 2 can depend on c 1 , c 2 , and f . The parameters α 2 and β 2 of the second period compensation scheme can then without loss of generality be chosen independently of the history.
The weight on the non-financial indicator f in an optimal performance measure is likely to depend on the abilities of the principal and the manager to make long-term contractual commitments. Our analysis below considers three commitment scenarios: (i) both the agent and the principal commit to long-term contracts, (ii) the principal commits to long-term contracts but the agent does not, and (iii) both the principal and the agent only commit to short-term (i.e., one-period) contracts. The time line below illustrates the sequence of events when the two parties sign short-term contracts. Under long-term contracting the sequence of events is also described by 
Long-Term Contracts
We suppose initially that the parties sign a two-period contract at the outset without the possibility of renegotiation. Given such "lock-in" contracts and our len framework, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to performance measures of the form:
Here u t denotes the coefficient on the leading indicator f , while the coefficients for the cash flows c t have been normalized to one. We note that the performance measures in (7) do not allow for c 1 to be included in π 2 . This specification is without loss of generality because the agent has equal access to credit and with full commitment both parties are indifferent as to whether the agent's reward for c 1 is partly delayed to the second period.
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Lemma 1 For any long-term contract of the form in (6) - (7), the certainty equivalent of the agent's expected utility at date 0 is given by:
where
16
Lemma 1 shows that the certainty equivalent of the agent's expected utility is given by the present value of mean-variance expression generated by the incentive schemes for each period. In particular, we note that the manager has the same time horizon as the principal and the parties are equally patient. These model specifications make the strongest possible case in favor of waiting for the actual investment returns in the second period rather than including the noisy leading indicator variable, f , in the performance measure.
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The risk-neutral principal seeks to maximize the present value of future cash flows net of compensation expenses, and therefore her optimization problem is:
15 The same argument can be made regarding the use of f in π 2 . However, our results in Proposition 2 below not only show that the coefficient u 2 could be set equal to zero, but that in fact it must be zero if the agent's participation constraint is to hold at the beginning of the second period.
16 All proofs are provided in the Appendix 17 In contrast, Dikolli (2001) examines a setting in which the agent is intrinsically more impatient than the principal. Similarly, in Wagenhofer (2001) , the agent has a relatively short time horizon because he leaves the firm for exogenous reasons before the completion of the project.
The constraints in the above optimization program reflect the agent's initial participation constraint and the incentive compatibility conditions with regard to the effort and investment choices, respectively. In the current len framework these incentive compatibility constraints can be replaced with the corresponding first-order conditions:
for each t, and
The left hand side in (10) is the "effective' coefficient on the leading indicator variable. Since the parties are assumed to commit to a long-term contract, only the effective coefficient matters while the individual u 1 and u 2 remain indeterminate. Optimality requires that the agent's participation constraint hold as an equality, and therefore the present value of the fixed payments,
is chosen so that CE 0 = 0. By a t (β t ) we denote the effort choice induced by β t , i.e., β t = e (a t (β t )). The principal's problem in (8) can therefore be restated as an unconstrained optimization problem in which β 1 , β 2 , and b are chosen to maximize:
The function Y t (·) represents the principal's expected net return from the agent's productive effort in period t, while Z * (·) represents the net present value of investments including the risk premium required to induce those investments.
18 The first-best investment level will be denoted by b 0 , i.e,
Conversely, if β 1 = β 2 the optimal investment does not coincide with b 0 since γ · m (b 0 ) = 1. Thus, investments do entail an indirect agency cost except for the special case in which the bonus coefficients are constant over time.
With long-term contracts, one may suspect that there is no need to include the leading indicator variablef = m(b) +δ in the agent's performance measure. Since this signal provides a noisy forecast of the future cash flow, it may be preferable for the principal to wait for the actual, and noiseless, cash return m(b) in the second period. The following result shows that this intuition holds only in case the underlying moral hazard problems do not change over time. Otherwise the noisy leading indicator variable is indeed valuable because it would be more costly for the principal to"disentangle" the investment problem from the moral hazard problems by means of a performance measure based only on cash flows. Since investments are not personally costly to the manager, the investment decision is subject to an induced rather than an intrinsic incentive problem. When the moral hazard problems in the two periods are identical, in the sense thatε 1 andε 2 have the same variance, the principal can choose identical bonus coefficients for the two periods with the consequence that the manager will make first-best investments. For such stationary problems, optimal performance measures can thus be based on the realized cash flows only.
Proposition 1 An optimal long-term contract sets (u *
In contrast, if the moral hazard problems differ across the two periods (due to different variances forε 1 andε 2 ), incentive schemes based only on cash flows will become "overloaded". Irrespective of its noisiness, the leading indicator variable now becomes valuable because it provides an additional instrument for separating the investment problem from the moral hazard problems.
The leading indicator variable may be viewed as an accrual which matches in the first period the investment expenditure with the second period cash return. This matching function becomes perfect in the extreme case where f is noiseless, that is, V ar(δ) = 0. The optimal weights on f then are
Irrespective of the choice of bonus coefficients, the agent will now invest the optimal amount: his performance measure in the first period,
is congruent with the principal's objective, while the second period performance measure is independent of b.
To further explore the importance of bilateral commitments to long-term contracts, we now consider a scenario in which the principal can credibly commit to a two-period contract, but the agent is unable to do so. Instead, the agent can seek alternative employment at the end of the first period. A contract which induces the agent to stay must then also satisfy the date 1 interim participation constraint:
where CE 1 (b, f ) denotes the certainty equivalent of the manager's date 1 expected utility as a function of his investment choice b and the realized value of the leading indicator f .
The following result establishes that the interim participation constraint is costless to the principal.
Proposition 2 Imposing an interim participation constraint changes neither the principal's expected payoff nor the induced level of investment, b
* , under long-term contracting. Given the interim participation constraint, the optimal coefficients on the leading indicator variable, f , are:
To see that u * 2 = 0 must indeed be zero, we note that according to Lemma 1:
Sincef = m(b) +δ andδ is normally distributed, the interim participation constraint requires that for any realizations of the signalf the manager's expected utility at date 1 be at least as large as his reservation utility. This restriction, however, is of no consequence to the principal. It can be seen from the incentive compatibility condition in (10) and the agent's mean-variance preferences in Lemma 1 that only the aggregate coefficient
matters, while the individual values of u 1 and u 2 remain indeterminate when the parties commit to a two-period contract. Since Proposition 2 shows that the interim participation constraint is costless for the principal, we will from hereon focus on long-term contracts which do satisfy this constraint. A standard finding in hidden action models is that optimal incentive provisions induce action choices that are less than first-best. Similarly, the primary issue in incomplete contracting problems with non-contractible investments is that agents have a tendency to underinvest. 19 In our setting, distortions in the second-best investment can go either way because investments are not personally costly to the manager. The following result shows that the direction of any distortions depends on intertemporal changes in the moral hazard problem. When the hidden action problem is relatively more severe in the second period (ε 2 has higher variance thanε 1 ), an optimal contract will set β 1 > β 2 . This difference in bonus coefficients leaves the agent with a tendency to underinvest. The principal can mitigate this bias by attaching a positive weight to the leading indicator variable. Due to the noisiness off , it would be too costly to alleviate the underinvestment problem entirely.
The interaction between the investment and moral hazard problems makes it desirable for the principal to compromise on both problems. To illustrate, Thus, it would also be too costly to implement second-best solutions to the moral hazard problems. The case where V ar(ε 1 ) > V ar(ε 2 ) can be argued symmetrically.
To conclude this section, we consider the impact of contract renegotiation. Suppose the principal offers long-term contracts, but she cannot commit not to renegotiate such a contract at the beginning of the second period. Whenever the initial contract specifies a bonus coefficient different from β 0 2 for the second period, the parties could sign a Pareto-improving contract at date 1, since at this stage the investment choice has been made and an optimal contract for the second period requires that β 2 = β 0 2 . Following the approach of Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) , we assume that the principal has the entire bargaining power and therefore makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer at date 1.
20 Since this renegotiation is anticipated by both parties at the initial date, the principal cannot do better than to offer a renegotiation-proof contract, i.e., one which sets β 2 = β 0 2 .
Corollary: Proposition 3 remains valid if the principal is constrained to offer renegotiation-proof long-term contracts.
The renegotiation proofness constraint is costly for the principal since β 2 is no longer chosen long-term optimal. Yet, our findings in Proposition 3 are unaffected because, despite the renegotiation proofness constraint, it is still true that β 1 > β 0 2 whenever V ar(ε 1 ) < V ar(ε 2 ) It is instructive to compare our findings with those of Sliwka (2001) , who argues that leading indicator variables are not valuable in a full-commitment setting, but that they may be useful if contracts are required to be renegotiationproof. In Sliwka's model the agent exerts 'operational' effort, which affects only the current period cash flow, and 'strategic' effort, which contributes to the firm's cash flows in each of the two periods. In addition, Sliwka's model is structured so that the first-period cash flow is a sufficient statistic for the leading indicator variable with respect to the agent's strategic effort.
21
Due to the interactions between the operational and the strategic incentive problems, the optimal performance measure in the full commitment scenario puts a negative weight on the leading indicator in order to "filter out" unwarranted noise from the cash flows. Sliwka (2001) , however, confines attention to performance measures which assign a non-negative weight 20 Demski and Frimor (2001) consider the effects of repeated renegotiation in a multiperiod extension of the Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) setting.
21 As a consequence, the leading indicator would be entirely useless from an incentive contracting perspective, if there were no incentive problem with regard to the agent's operational action choice.
the leading indicator variable. Relative to the optimal effort choices in the full commitment setting, the optimal renegotiation-proof contract induces a higher level of operational effort, but a smaller level of strategic effort. Since the leading indicator variable reflects only the strategic effort, this variable becomes valuable for realigning the allocation of efforts. The latter result is consistent with our finding in the above corollary.
Short-Term Contracts
We now turn to a setting in which the principal cannot commit to a twoperiod contract. In the first period, the principal hires an agent and offers a contract of the form:
At the end of the first period, the principal is free to contract either with the same or a different agent.
22 The second period contract is chosen optimally given the principal's information at that stage and her conjectures about the first period decisions. Furthermore, the first period contract is chosen in anticipation of the second-period contract being sequentially optimal. To characterize optimal short-term contracts, it is useful to first consider a "managerial rotation" setting in which a different agent is hired in the second period. The second agent is offered a contract of the form:
The second period contracting problem is a standard one-shot len contracting problem with one exception: the performance measure c 2 depends on the investment decision, b, undertaken by the previous agent. The principal and the new agent share identical conjectures about the investment decision 22 We assume implicitly that the principal can choose from a competitive fringe of identical agents whose preferences are again described by negative exponential utility. made in the first period. Denoting the conjectured investment by b c , the second agent's preferences over alternative linear incentive contracts can be represented by the following certainty equivalent expression:
The principal adjusts the fixed payment α 2 (b c ) so as to account for the fact that the second period cash flow will be shifted by m(b c ). Provided that the conjecture is rational (i.e., b c = b), both the principal and the first agent are indifferent as to whether the second period contract is offered to the incumbent or to a different agent. Since managerial rotation is rationally anticipated by both parties, any investment incentives have to be generated in the first period by means of the leading indicator variable. In our len framework the first-period agent will again have mean-variance preferences over alternative linear incentive schemes. In particular, the first agent will choose a 1 and b so as to maximize:
In contrast to the long-term contracting scenario analyzed in the previous section, the bonus coefficient β 1 now has no bearing on the agent's investment decision. Obviously, this would not be true if the principal were to retain the same agent for both periods. The following result, however, shows that a managerial rotation policy is essential under short-term contracts.
Lemma 2 Under short-term contracting, the principal hires a different agent in the second period.
To see why managerial rotation is essential, consider a case when the same agent is retained over two periods. We note that a solution to short-term contracting must induce agent responses (a 1 , a 2 , b) satisfying the following conditions: (iii) The response (a 1 , b) maximizes the agents's expected utility given the current contract s 1 (·) and the anticipated contract s 2 (·) in the second period. Since the second period contract parameters α 2 and β 2 must be based on the conjectured investment level b c rather than the actual b, the incentive compatibility condition for b becomes:
Like in the long-term contracting problem, the agent's investment return will again be partly provided through the second period cash flow. If the first period contract s 1 (·) maximizes the principal's expected payoff (among all first period contracts which induce agent responses and second period contracts satisfying the above sequential rationality requirements) the agent must break-even in the first period provided he chooses (a 1 , b). For any such arrangement, however, the agent could do better by the following deviation: choose a level of investmentb which is myopically optimal for the current period, i.e.,
and thereafter reject the second period contract. Since α 1 is chosen so as to compensate the agent for the higher investment level b, he would achieve more than his reservation utility in the first period. 23 We conclude that there 23 It should be noted that the preceding argument relies crucially on the fact that the induced level of investment b is interior. To illustrate this, suppose the feasible set of investments is given by the interval [0,b] . If furthermore investments are sufficiently valu-is no solution to the principal's problem in which the same agent is retained for both periods when b is unobservable.
To further characterize the solution to short-term contracting, we note that the second period compensation parameters (α 2 , β 2 ) can be chosen so as to maximize:
subject to the second-period agent's incentive and participation constraints. Therefore, the fixed payment α 2 will be chosen so that the agent's certainty equivalent in (12) is zero at the conjectured level of investment b c . Furthermore, the second period bonus parameter, β 2 , will be chosen to maximize Y 2 (β 2 ), as defined in connection with the objective function in (11).
For the first-period contract, the certainty equivalent expression in (12) shows that the desired investment expenditure must meet the incentive compatibility condition:
and the participation constraint must hold with equality for an optimal contract:
Substituting (14) and (15) into the principal's objective function yields an unconstrained optimization problem in which (β 1 , β 2 , b) are chosen to
able so that the principal wants to induce the maximum investment, the coefficient u 1 will be set equal to:û
.
In this boundary setting, it is possible to have optimal short-term contracts which retain the same agent for both periods. The essential difference to the unbounded investment set is that now the agent cannot invest more thanb despite the anticipated second period returns.
By (β 1 ,β 2 ,b) we denote the optimal choice variables for the objective function in (16). Clearly,
is increasing in b due to the concavity of the function m(·). We obtain the following result: 
In sum, we find that short-term contracts differ in two major ways from the long-term incentive provisions characterized in the previous section. First, the bonus parameter of the second-period contract is chosen "opportunistically" to maximize the expected payoff attainable in that period. Second, the investment incentives have to be provided exclusively through the leading indicator variable (rather than through a combination of the leading indicator and the second period cash return). In particular, the bonus coefficients now have no bearing on the investment decision.
To conclude this section, we examine an alternative information structure in which the first period investment is observable to the principal. As before, the investment choice is assumed to be non-contractible. The natural question then is whether the principal can use this information to improve her expected payoffs. Under short-term contracting, sequential rationality again compels the principal to select a second period contract which appropriates the entire investment return to be realized in that period. However, unlike the earlier scenario in which the payments were based on the conjectured 24 The proof of this result is omitted. investment level, the principal can now rely on her observation of the actual investment choice. As a consequence, the same agent can be retained for both periods. We note that the observability of b does not change the principal's expected payoff. In either observability scenario, the investment incentives must be generated exclusively through the leading indicator variable.
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Performance Comparison of Long-Term and Short-Term Contracts
This section compares long-term and short-term contracts along the following dimensions: i) the principal's expected payoff, ii) the induced level of investment, and iii) the weight on the leading indicator variable in the agent's performance measure. With regard to the principal's expected payoff, the comparison between the two contracting scenarios might appear quite obvious. After all, with long-term contracts the principal always has the option of committing to the same course of action she would have taken in equilibrium under short-term contracting. This argument, however, does not apply in our model since the optimal short-term contract requires hiring a different agent in the second period. 26 By definition, this scenario is ruled out under long-term contracting.
The work of Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom (1990) has identified two sufficient conditions under which long-term and short-term contracts are performance equivalent.
27 First, all public information is contractible, and second there is no information asymmetry at the time contracts are renegotiated. Since the principal does not observe the agent's investment choice b, the agent does acquire private information in our model. 25 It is an open question whether the principal's unverifiable observation of the investment choice can improve her expected payoff attainable with long-term commitments.
26 Alternatively, if b is observable, the second period contract can reflect the observed (but unverifiable) investment choice.
27 See also, Rey and Salanie (1990) and Chiapori et.al. (1994) .
Consider first the case where the moral hazard problem is relatively more severe in the second period, i.e., V ar(ε 1 ) < V ar(ε 2 ). Propositions 3 and 4 have shown that in this case both long-term and short-term contracting result in underinvestment. Since long-term contracts can rely on both the leading indicator and the second period cash returns in generating investment incentives, one might expect long-term contracts to perform better. The following result confirms this intuition.
Proposition 5 If V ar(ε 1 ) < V ar(ε 2 ), long-term contracting strictly dominates short-term contracting.
The proof of Proposition 5 is constructive in the sense that any shortterm contract can be improved upon with a suitable two-period commitment. Given any (β 1 ,β 2 ,û), suppose first thatβ 1 >β 2 . Under long-term contracting, the principal can always induce the same effort choices and a more efficient investment decision by setting β * t =β t and reducing the weight on the noisy leading indicator to max{0,û − γ ·β 2 β 1 }. Such a compensation scheme strictly dominates the original incentive scheme since in addition to the more efficient investment choice, the new contract reduces the amount of risk imposed on the agent. Similarly, whenβ 1 <β 2 , the principal can achieve a higher expected payoff by setting β 1 = β 2 =β 2 , and u = 0. This new contract is superior in two respects; (i) it induces first-best investments without imposing risk associated with the noisy signal f , and (ii) it improves the agent's first-period effort choice sinceβ 1 < β 1 =β 0 2 <β 0 1 . Since long-term contracts generate investment incentives via the leading indicator as well as the second period cash returns, one might expect that long-term contracting induces more investment (i.e., less underinvestment). This intuition, however, turns out not to be correct. One can find parameterizations for which the optimal investment under long-term contracting is less than that under short-term contracting and vice-versa.
To illustrate, we consider the following numerical example. Suppose that e(a t ) = The somewhat surprising finding that short-term contracting can result in larger investments reflects the interaction between the investment and the moral hazard problems in our model. The principal's marginal cost of inducing investment is lower with long-term contracts for given bonus parameters β 1 and β 2 . For fixed bonus coefficients, it would therefore indeed be optimal to induce larger investment under long-term contracting. The countervailing effect, however, is that the marginal cost of providing effort incentives is decreasing in b. Therefore it may become preferable to "overcompensate" along one dimension, e.g., set β * 1 >>β 1 but induce b * <b. The above numerical example demonstrates this possibility whenb is close to the first-best level b 0 , butβ 1 is relatively small compared to β 0 1 . To summarize, the advantage of long-term contracts is that the principal can commit to ex-post inefficient contracts for the second period in order to maximize her ex-ante expected payoff. Specifically, the second period bonus parameter β * 2 under long-term contracting is generally different from its "myopically" optimal value of β 0 2 . In addition, the long-term contract setting allows the principal to commit not to appropriate the impending investment returns in the second period. Taken together, these effects explain the dominance result in Proposition 5. With regard to the induced investment level and the weight on the leading indicator variable, however, the comparison is ambiguous across the two contracting scenarios.
Consider now the opposite case where the first period moral hazard prob-lem is more severe, i.e, V ar(ε 1 ) > V ar(ε 2 ), Propositions 3 and 4 have shown that long-term contracting unambiguously induces more investment because b * > b 0 >b. Furthermore, the optimal weight on the leading indicator is always less under long-term contracting than under short-term contracting since u * < 0 <û. Our next result, though, shows that for this setting the principal may be worse-off with long-term commitments.
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Proposition 6 For any given V ar(ε 2 ), short-term contracting strictly dominates long-term contracting for values of V ar(ε 1 ) sufficiently large.
The marginal cost of providing effort incentives is increasing in V ar(ε 1 ).
Holding all else constant, the optimal bonus parameter β 1 will therefore be decreasing in V ar(ε 1 ). As β 1 is lowered, however, the manager views investments as less expensive. To control the resulting overinvestment problem, the principal may distort the choice of bonus parameters and put a negative weight on the leading indicator variable. Under short-term contracting, in contrast, the agent's investment incentives are independent of the choice of the bonus parameters β 1 and β 2 . The principal therefore can contain the tendency to overinvest without having to compromise on the choice of the bonus coefficients in the two periods. Therefore short-term contracts dominate when the overinvestment problem under long-term contracting becomes sufficiently severe, i.e., V ar(ε 1 ) becomes sufficiently large.
Finally, we note that the dominance result in Proposition 6 also applies to a setting in which the agent's investment choice is observed by the principal. As argued in Section 4, the performance of short-term contracting remains unchanged, though there is no longer a need for managerial rotation. The dominance of short-term contracting then derives from the fact that the second-period contract can incorporate knowledge of the actual choice of b.
By construction, the long-term contracts examined in Section 3 do not have that flexibility.
Conclusion
This paper has examined an agency model in which a manager makes an investment in the first period and contributes personally costly effort in both periods. The investment decision is not directly contractible, but the principal can rely on a leading indicator variable which provides a noisy estimate of future investment related cash flows. Our analysis shows that the duration of the manager's incentive contract determines the need for including the leading indicator variables in the managerial performance measure. The optimal weight on the leading indicator variable, relative to the weight on cash flow, depends crucially on whether the principal offers a long-term contract or a sequence of short-term contracts.
When faced with a sequence of one-period contracts, the agent anticipates being held up in the second period when investment expenditures are sunk. The imperfect leading indicator variable then becomes an essential instrument for mitigating a holdup problem and motivating the manager to make any investments. With long-term commitments, in contrast, the leading indicator variable is valuable if and only if the underlying moral hazard problems differ across the two periods. For a stationary agency problem, the principal can choose incentive schemes which are identical over time and are based only on cash flows. As a consequence, the manager will fully internalize the net return of investments. However, we also find that whenever the optimal long-term incentive schemes vary over time, the leading indicator variable becomes valuable for matching the future investment return with the first period expenditure.
While short-term contracting always results in underinvestment, the optimal long-term contract may lead to under-or overinvestment depending on the relative severity of the periodic agency problems. When the induced overinvestment problem is sufficiently severe, we find that the principal is better off not making long-term commitments but instead offering a sequence of one-period contracts.
The main part of our analysis has assumed that the investment decision is not observable to the principal. As noted in Section 4, the performance of short-term contracting is unchanged if the investment choice is in fact observed by the principal, yet it remains unverifiable and therefore non-contractible. The natural question is whether for this alternative observability scenario the efficiency of long-term contracting can be improved by considering a larger class of contracts which allow the principal some discretion in selecting future incentive schemes depending on her observation of the initial investment decision.
The model developed in this paper has studied the use of a single leading indicator variable in a multiperiod context. Earlier papers by Feltham and Xie (1994) and Datar, Kulp and Lambert (2001) have examined the aggregation of multiple signals in managerial performance measures albeit only in a one-period context. To gain a better understanding of the use of non-financial performance indicators and the construction of balanced scorecards, it would be desirable to combine the existing approaches so as to include multiple, and possibly correlated, leading indicator variables and to characterize the relative weights that should be placed on these variables both cross-sectionally and over time.
At the end of the first period, the agent will make his optimal savings decision so as to maximize:
Let U * 1 (s 1 , f) denote the maximized value of U 1 (W 1 |s 1 , f). Solving for the optimal savings W * 1 and simplifying yields:
The agent's date 0 expected utility is given by
where both s 1 and f are viewed as random at date 0. Computing the expected value yields:
where CE 0 is as given in the statement of Lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 1:
For any given β 1 and β 2 , the principal's optimal investment choice b * satisfies the first-order condition:
We note that if β 1 = β 2 , then the optimal b * is equal to the first-best level b
whenever β 1 = β 2 . From the agent's incentive compatibility condition in (10), we thus obtain that β 1 = β 2 is equivalent to (u 1 , u 2 ) = 0.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that the optimal bonus coefficients β * 1 and β * 2 are equal if and only if σ 
Proof of Proposition 2:
At date 1, the certainty equivalent of the agent's future expected utility is given by:
The interim participation constraint requires that CE 1 ≥ 0 for all realizations off . Therefore u 2 = 0 and, by the incentive constraint in (10), the agent's investment choice satisfies:
Given these choices for u 1 and u 2 , the certainty equivalent of the agent's expected utility at date 0, as identified in Lemma 1, reduces to:
For an optimal long-term contract the constants α 1 and α 2 must be chosen so that CE 0 = 0, and therefore the principal's expected payoff is again given by the function V * (β 1 , β 2 , b) in (11) corresponding to long-term contracts which satisfy only the initial participation constraint.
Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1: β * 1 ≥ β * 2 if and only if V ar(ε 1 ) < V ar(ε 2 ). Following the notation in the proof of Proposition 1, the principal's objective is:
Suppose that contrary to the claim, V ar(ε 1 ) < V ar(ε 2 ) yet β * 1 ≤ β * 2 . We know that the values of β The principal could then decrease β * 2 to the value of β * 1 with the consequence that:
The above inequality is based on the fact that Y 2 (·) is a single-peaked function with its maximum to the left of β * 1 ( and β * 2 ). Furthermore:
for all values of β * 1 , β * 2 and b * . This contradicts the hypothesis β *
For bonus coefficients satisfying these inequalities, the principal could increase β * 1 to β Step 2: u * andâ 2 from the agent.
At the beginning of the second period, the principal chooses (α 2 , β 2 ) so as to maximize:
subject to the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints. At date 1, the agent's preferences over alternative contracts are given by
where b is the actual level of investment undertaken by the agent in the previous period. The incentive compatibility condition in the second period is β 2 = e (a 2 ). We denote the optimal action choice in response to β 2 by a 2 (β 2 ).
The fixed payment α 2 is chosen so that the agent's certainty equivalent is zero at the conjectured level of investmentb. Thus α 2 (b) satisfies:
To check incentive compatibility in the first period, we define the function:
Thus, CE 1 (a 2 (β 2 ),b,b) = 0. We note that the sequentially optimal contact for the second period is independent of the outcomes c 1 and f in the first period. Instead the principal relies on his conjectureb to set the fixed payment α 2 (b). Furthermore the payoffs resulting from the second period contract are independent of the amount of investment induced in the first period.
Contingent on the contract s 1 = α 1 + β 1 [c 1 + u 1 · f ], the agent anticipates to be offered the contract s 2 = α 2 (b)+β 2 ·c 2 in the second period. By Lemma 1, the agent's preferences for such a contract is given by: The incentive compatibility condition for an interiorb is:
and the participation constraint in the first period requires that:
since CE 1 (a 2 (β 2 ),b,b) = 0 implies that the agent would not accept the firstperiod contract if U 1 (a 1 (β 1 ),b) < 0. The above contracts and actions would be optimal if the agent were forced to stay in the second period. However, the agent could do better by choosingb, whereb maximizes:
and thereafter rejecting the second period contract. Note that:
U 1 (a 1 (β 1 ),b) > U 1 (a 1 (β 1 ),b) = 0, and the agent would do better by the above deviation.
Proof of Proposition 5: Let (û 1 ,β 1 ,β 2 ) denote the optimal parameters under short-term contracting. As argued in connection with Proposition 4, β 2 = β 
As argued in proposition 2,the principal's expected payoff under long-term contracting is given:
Under short-term contracting the principal's expected payoff is:
Since V ar(ε 1 ) < V ar(ε 2 ), we know that β becomes large. Thereforê
The limit in (23) reflects that the principal moves β 1 to zero as σ , sufficiently large:
Consider an increasing sequence of σ ). Therefore the inequality in (24) again holds, completing the proof.
